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63 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND FEDERALISM 
Ann E. Carlson* †  
Introduction 
Everyone loves energy efficiency. Among an array of carbon-reducing 
strategies, energy efficiency surely ranks as the least controversial. Indeed, 
increasing energy efficiency is frequently lauded as having “net negative 
costs”—to use the terminology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change—meaning that the benefits outweigh the costs, even excluding 
benefits from avoided climate change. 
Yet the U.S. system for regulating appliances—which account for a huge 
percentage of the nation’s carbon emissions—is a mess. Since the federal 
government began regulating appliance efficiency in the 1970s, the process 
has been characterized by frequent delays and foot-dragging, followed by 
lawsuits and legislative overhauls. Amidst the turmoil, a number of states 
have attempted to assert leadership in setting appliance standards but have 
often faced federal roadblocks in doing so. I suggest that a reallocation of 
regulatory authority to parallel our system of auto emissions regulation is in 
order. The next administration should continue to issue appliance standards, 
but it should also support legislation to grant California special authority to 
issue standards that exceed the federal floor. 
I. Energy Efficiency and Carbon Emissions 
Energy efficiency can include any number of policy strategies, such as 
setting tougher building standards, reducing transmission line leakage, and 
improving the efficiency of consumer and commercial products like air con-
ditioners and computers. The savings in carbon emissions from adopting 
these strategies could be astoundingly large: buildings in the United States, 
for example, are responsible for 10% of worldwide emissions. Close to 60% 
of U.S. commercial building emissions and 75% of residential building 
emissions come from appliances, including water heaters, air conditioners, 
heaters, refrigerators, and electronics. Another 28% of commercial emis-
sions and 13% of residential emissions come from lighting, which is 
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regulated together with appliances under federal law. Thus more than 85% 
of commercial and residential emissions come from appliances and lighting.  
The charts below illustrate the sources of building emissions by com-
mercial and residential sectors, respectively:  
U.S. Carbon Emissions from Buildings, by End Use 
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Source: Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy, 2005 Buildings Energy Data Book.  
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In the long run, a shift to alternative energy sources that emit no carbon 
would dramatically reduce emissions from buildings. But in the near and 
medium term, improvements in the energy efficiency of appliances may 
achieve more reductions at cheaper cost. Moreover unless the U.S. economy 
moves entirely away from fossil fuels as an energy source, energy efficiency 
can and should play a central role in stabilizing or reducing overall energy 
demand. And even if we replace our entire energy stock with renewable fu-
els, making appliances that reduce the use of those fuels is surely a laudable 
goal.  
II. Federalism and Appliance Standards 
California first began regulating appliance standards in the 1970s, and 
New York and Minnesota quickly followed. These states regulated appliance 
standards in order to overcome a market failure: appliances are often pur-
chased not by those who will pay utility bills (renters/lessees of commercial 
and residential property and owners of new homes) but by developers and 
landlords, whose incentives are to purchase appliances with the cheapest 
initial cost rather than those that provide long term energy savings.  
In response to state regulatory activity in setting appliance standards, the 
federal government stepped in. In 1978 Congress enacted legislation that in 
large measure preempts states from adopting their own standards if the fed-
eral government has adopted a standard for the product at issue. States can 
apply for a waiver of preemption requirements for products with federal 
standards, but to date the Department of Energy (“DOE”) has rejected the 
only waiver request that has been submitted—California’s 2006 petition for 
a waiver for residential clothes washers. The standards for a waiver of pre-
emption requirements are tough to meet: under the Energy Policy Act a state 
needs to show that more stringent state regulation is necessary to meet “un-
usual and compelling State or local energy or water interests” that “are 
substantially different in nature or magnitude than those prevailing in the 
United States generally.” States must also seek a waiver to regulate products 
that lack federal standards, but generally speaking the DOE has granted 
such waivers liberally. Essentially, then, we have federal standards for major 
appliances (central air conditioning, heat pumps, furnaces, boilers, refrigera-
tors, freezers, washers, dryers ovens dishwashers, etc.) and state standards 
for less significant appliances (hot tubs, pool pumps, compact audio prod-
ucts, and DVD players, to name a few).  
Federal preemption of appliance standards is not problematic if federal 
authority is used effectively. If the aim of federal regulation is to promote 
improved energy efficiency, however, the federal government’s track record 
to date is not promising. Over the past forty years, federal performance on 
appliance standards has often included delay in implementing enabling leg-
islation followed by litigation, grudging compliance, and the adoption of 
relatively weak standards. Weak standards obviously produce fewer energy 
savings and hence fewer greenhouse gas emissions reductions than stronger 
ones. Delay in the context of climate change has clear significance given the 
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long shelf life of various greenhouse gases—100 years for carbon dioxide, 
for example—and the resulting accumulation of gases in the atmosphere. 
Federal foot-dragging in setting appliance standards began in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 
passed in 1978, mandated energy efficiency standards for thirteen appli-
ances if the regulations could be economically justified. In 1982 the DOE 
announced that it would not issue any standards. NRDC v. Herrington, a 
1985 D.C. Circuit decision, overturned the DOE’s regulatory declination. 
In the meantime, since the DOE had a general policy to approve state 
waiver requests in the absence of federal standards, several states stepped in 
to regulate, including California, Florida, Kansas, New York, and Massachu-
setts. The flurry of state legislative activity led to manufacturers again 
clamoring for national standards and federal preemption. The Natural Re-
sources Defense Council worked with appliance trade groups to pass the 
National Appliance Energy Conservation Act (“NAECA”) in 1987. The 
NAECA set appliance standards statutorily for a number of residential ap-
pliances rather than relying on the DOE to set them. But many appliances 
remained without standards, so the pattern has repeated itself several times. 
States issue standards for appliances omitted in federal legislation, then 
Congress preempts those standards in legislation, including in 1992 (the 
Energy Policy Act) and again in 2005 (the Energy Policy Act of 2005). 
Pending legislation in the 110th Congress includes new provisions to pre-
empt state standards for various types of incandescent lamps. This is 
precisely the prediction that Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian made in Toward 
a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 
an important 1985 article.  
The pattern of state regulation followed by federal preemption poses at 
least two potential problems. First, the federal government frequently sets 
standards at levels lower than seems appropriate when balancing energy 
savings against increased manufacturing costs. Second, manufacturers may 
be faced with competing state standards and the prospect of manufacturing 
separate products for a number of different markets around the country.  
III. Lax Appliance Standards and Delays in Promulgation 
The federal government’s decision to issue no efficiency standards in 
1982 is only one instance of federal inaction. In 2005 fifteen states sued the 
Department of Energy for failing to upgrade efficiency standards for twenty-
two separate appliances. As of 2006, the DOE was behind schedule in set-
ting new standards by as many as thirteen years.  
The DOE has also been subject to political pushes and pulls in standard 
setting. For example, the Clinton Administration adopted a SEER 13 stan-
dard for all new air conditioning equipment as of January 2006, an increase 
from the existing SEER 10 standard. In 2001 the Bush Administration an-
nounced it was rolling back the standard to SEER 12, despite the position of 
its own Environmental Protection Agency that the rollback was based on a 
DOE analysis that both overstated the costs of the SEER 13 standard and 
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underestimated the resulting savings. In 2004 the Second Circuit found the 
Bush Administration’s promulgation of the SEER 12 standard invalid in 
NRDC v. Abraham, and the SEER 13 standard took effect January 1, 2007. 
The difference between the two standards is huge: the SEER 13 standard 
will reduce energy usage equivalent to the annual energy use of twenty-six 
million U.S. households (4.2 quads of energy) over twenty-five years versus 
only three quads of energy under the SEER 12 standard. Further, the higher 
SEER standard will reduce 25% more smog-forming metric tons of nitrous 
oxides and carbon than the SEER 12 standard. 
IV. Multiplicity of Standards for National Product Markets 
A byproduct of the federal government’s failure to enact standards for 
certain appliances is that multiple states step in to fill the regulatory void. 
The result can mean a patchwork of state standards for numerous products.  
Even proponents of a strong state role in environmental policymaking 
advocate federal preemption for the regulation of products for which there is 
a national market, such as appliances. The argument in favor of national 
standards is twofold. First, without national standards, states can shift the 
costs of regulation outside their jurisdictional boundaries. An appliance 
manufacturer in Michigan will bear many of the costs of regulation imposed 
by Massachusetts. Second, national product manufacturers enjoy economies 
of scale in producing the same products for consumers in all fifty states. 
Multiple state regulations not only eliminate this advantage but also can be 
costly to comply with. Industry frequently looks to Congress to preempt 
state laws in favor of national legislation after a flurry of state regulatory 
activity. This is precisely the pattern that has repeated itself several times 
with respect to appliance standards. 
There are certainly counterarguments to those made in favor of national 
preemption. Empirical evidence of more stringent auto emissions regula-
tions in California suggests that residents of the state, rather than 
manufacturers, bear the financial burden of their cleaner technology. And 
the argument that manufacturers will face fifty separate emission standards 
absent federal legislation seems overstated. States often piggyback on one 
another’s standards, and few states in the country have market shares large 
enough to impose separate regulations with confidence that manufacturers 
will continue to serve their states. Delaware is not California.  
In the context of appliance standards not covered by federal standards, it 
is true that some states jump into the regulatory void to enact their own 
standards. Most states, however, simply follow California’s lead and enact 
California standards. Nevertheless, they are not required to follow Califor-
nia’s lead, and there is no process for harmonizing state regulations to 
minimize regulatory multiplicity.  
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V. California as Regulatory Leader 
We have two problems, then, with our current system of appliance stan-
dards regulation. The federal government has frequently dragged its feet in 
issuing national standards and the standards it has issued are often weaker 
than they could be to achieve significant energy savings at manageable cost. 
And for those appliances where no federal standards exist, multiple states 
jump in and sometimes issue different regulations for the same product. 
Moreover many appliances remain subject to no regulation in states that 
choose not to regulate.  
We frequently view our regulatory options in environmental policymak-
ing as federal regulation, state devolution, or some hybrid of cooperative 
federalism where the federal government sets minimum standards and states 
implement those standards taking local conditions into account. With re-
spect to automobile emissions standards under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 
however, we use a different option. Under the CAA, California has special 
regulatory authority to issue emissions standards that are at least as protec-
tive of public health and welfare as federal standards. All other states are 
preempted from regulating auto emissions but can opt into the California 
standards. As a result, about a third of the country drives “California cars” 
and the remainder drives “federal cars.”  
This unique scheme of federalism—what I’ve elsewhere called “iterative 
federalism”—has achieved remarkable reductions in pollutants from cars. 
To take one example, California cars are more than 99% cleaner than they 
were in 1970. Moreover the California experience has allowed the state to 
take policy risks that, if successful, can be and have been exported to the 
rest of the country. Indeed, over the course of the forty-two years since Cali-
fornia was first granted its “superregulator” status, the federal government 
has followed California’s regulatory lead on at least eight separate occa-
sions. The California provision allows for the best of centralization and 
decentralization: the state serves as a laboratory of democracy while endors-
ing industry’s desire to avoid multiple state standards.  
Why not adopt a similar regulatory scheme for the regulation of appli-
ance standards? As long as California adopts standards at least as stringent 
as federal standards, the state should be allowed to regulate all appliances, 
not just those without federal standards. States that wish to follow Califor-
nia’s regulatory lead should be allowed to opt in, just as they can choose to 
follow California’s auto emissions standards. States other than California 
should be preempted from issuing their own standards. The country can then 
gain the benefits of policy experimentation and leadership while avoiding 
overlapping and potentially conflicting state standards.  
Why California? The state has a long history of regulating in this area—
a history that predates federal regulation—and is the de facto regulatory 
leader for appliances not subject to federal standards. Thus it already pos-
sesses the regulatory capacity and expertise to take on the role. Moreover 
the state obviously has a large enough consumer market to ensure that 
manufacturers will continue to serve Californians.  
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Congress should provide California with special status to regulate appli-
ance standards whether or not it passes an economy-wide cap-and-trade 
scheme to regulate carbon emissions. In theory such a scheme should raise 
energy prices enough to encourage appliance manufacturers to increase the 
energy efficiency of their products. In practice, though, the same market 
failure that led to appliance standards in the first place—a disconnect be-
tween those who buy appliances and those who pay their long term energy 
costs—will likely interfere with price signals sent by a carbon cap-and-trade 
system. Instead, Congress should allow California to set standards more 
stringent than federal law in order to encourage policy innovation that, if 
successful, can ultimately be exported to the rest of the country. 
Conclusion 
Tackling climate change will require regulatory innovation across sec-
tors and across levels of government, from cities to states to the federal 
government to international organizations. Appliance-efficiency regulation 
is an area that has largely escaped scholarly attention, yet holds the promise 
of significant carbon reductions at a cost savings. Locating regulatory power 
in both the federal government and in California magnifies the likelihood of 
maximizing these savings. 
